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Manufacturing Resilience on the Margins:
Street Gangs, Property, & Vulnerability
Theory
Lua Kamál Yuille*
ABSTRACT
Within law, contemporary street gangs are cast as corporatized
criminal enterprises, whose primary goal is the acquisition of illicit
economic capital. The sophistication of corporate gangs has led to the
development of novel control mechanisms like gang injunctions, which
are civil legal remedies employed to disperse unwanted gang activity from
protected communities. This article suggests that the idea of property—
and the vulnerability associated therewith—is central to understanding
gangs. Accepting the well-established proposition that gangs arise due to
the unavailability or inaccessibility of markets for mainstream and
legitimized forms of capital, this article argues that gangs are best
understood as corporate institutions engaged in the sustained,
transgressive creation of alternative markets for the development of the
types of property interests that scholars have associated with the
development and pursuit of identity and “personhood.” That is, gangs are
mechanisms through which networked vulnerable subjects seek to create
resilience in each other.
The particular vulnerabilities to which gang members are least
resilient have been clearly identified and thoroughly explored in
sociological literature. Nonetheless, the criminological framing of gangs
as creators rather than subjects of vulnerability within already
marginalized communities has prevented widespread implementation or
*Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. Various drafts and pieces of
this article, benefitted from the comments and reactions of participants in the 7th Annual
Meeting of the Association of Law, Property, and Society (ALPS), a Workshop on
Vulnerability and Social Justice, Property Works-in-Progress 2016, and the inaugural
Margaret E. Montoya Scholarship Retreat (including the inestimable Margaret E. Montoya,
herself). Thanks to F. E. Guerra-Pujol and my research assistants, Kelsey Treuil and
Elizabeth D. Williams. I also thank the actual and imputed gang members, whose
experiences motivated this line of work and who graciously participated in my empirical
research study that significantly influenced this theoretical work. I bear, of course, all
responsibility for any deficiencies. FTJ. JGY.
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political consideration these realities. Instead, anti-gang strategies
eliminate resilience to which gangs and their members have access by
imposing a presumption of criminality on individuals believed to be
associated with gangs and destabilize the sources of resilience available to
people and institutions proximal to gangs.
Using the reimagined potential for government action and
responsibility that vulnerability theory permits, this article suggests that
local governments should compensate gang members for refraining from
certain gang conduct. This approach, which has seen success when
implemented by private and government actors (both in the gang and other
contexts), offers a potentially effective response to gang member
vulnerability—i.e. fostering resilience—that is responsive to the social
justice, economic, and political considerations that gangs present.
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“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time. . . takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your
resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.”
- Oliver Wendell Holmes1
PROLOGUE
At Homeboy Industries, a forty-nine-year-old lifetime gangbanger
whose skin and tattoos have begun to sag walks into Greg’s office and
announces, “I don’t have an identity . . . . I need help.” He is followed
by a sixteen-year-old member of Tortilla Flats—David Escobar—who
has been in four probation camps since he was eleven years old.
“Can you hang here, son?” Greg Boyle asks.
“Everyone in Compton is my enemy,” David answers.
“Yeah, but here everyone is your friend, no one is your enemy, and
that includes people from all the neighborhoods in Compton.”
“You mean—I would work here with enemies?”
“No hanging, no banging, no slanging. And you get a job here and
services—you get a life. Can you hang here, son?”
David looks at Greg—angry, frightened, defensive, alone.2

I.

INTRODUCTION

The pages that follow advance a simple central proposition: Local
governments should pay gang members to refrain from gang activity. But
the deeper story this article tells is more complex, with implications far
beyond the relatively confined world of the contemporary American street
gang inhabited by an estimated 850,000 members.3 That more complex
story is of the universal human condition of vulnerability, the instinct and
imperative to build mechanisms to confront that vulnerability, and of
property’s important role in that task.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
2. JORJA LEAP, JUMPED IN: WHAT GANGS TAUGHT ME ABOUT VIOLENCE, DRUGS,
LOVE, AND REDEMPTION 216 (2012).
3. This figure constitutes less than one-half of one percent of Americans. See Arlen
Egley Jr. et al., Juvenile Justice Fact Sheet: Highlights of the 2012 National Youth gang
Survey, U.S. OFFICE OF JUV. JUSTICE & DELINQ. PREVENTION 1 (Dec. 2014),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248025.pdf; cf. NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR., NATIONAL GANG
REPORT iii (2013) https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-nationalgang-report-2013/view [hereinafter 2013 NATIONAL GANG REPORT] (declining to estimate
the number of gang members in the US because of both “inconclusive reporting” and “lack
of confidence in estimates collected”).
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The surface story of this article offers a provocative and unexpected
approach to what is framed as a growing national, regional, and local gang
threat.4 More predictable, is the response of local governments and law
enforcement agencies, which have developed creative initiatives to disrupt
and dismantle the reported 33,000 gangs across the country.5 Most of this
experimentation has focused on variations on traditional policing, like the
creation of specialized “gang units” within police departments and
targeted heightened surveillance operations against gang leaders.6
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, political actors also turned to civil legal
mechanisms to combat what continues to be framed as the growing,
intractable menace of the corporatized, terroristic, criminal street gang.7
The wholly criminal image of street gangs reflected in the punitive
(and criminalizing) orientation of anti-gang legal mechanisms, like gang
injunctions, is myopic and fatally flawed. Street gangs and their
constituent members often do engage in unlawful and criminal conduct.8
However, the consensus across the varied fields engaged in gang research
is that the purpose of the contemporary gangs is not the commission of
crime.9 Rather, violence and criminality are secondary or tertiary
characteristics of gangs, necessitated by the inaccessibility of mainstream
markets and the legal mechanisms that create, structure, and regulate those
markets.10 Properly understood, street gangs are social institutions creating
and operating in alternative markets for the kinds of social and financial
capital that provides resilience to the universal vulnerability concomitant
with the human condition and which is inaccessible to them through
4. See NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR., NATIONAL GANG REPORT (2015)
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-national-gang-report2015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 NATIONAL GANG REPORT].
5. Gangs, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/vc_majorthefts/gangs (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
6. See generally THE MODERN GANG READER § 5 (Arlen Egley Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed.
2006) (discussing various public programs and policies used to address gang-related
problems).
7. EDWARD L. ALLAN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF POLICING BY INJUNCTION 63–65 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams
III eds., 2004) (ebook).
8. See, e.g., David C. Pyrooz, From Colors and Guns to Caps and Gowns? The
Effects of Gang Membership on Educational Attainment, 51 J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ.
56, 57 (2014) (summarizing current research concluding the same).
9. Brenda C. Coughlin & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Urban Street Gang After
1970, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 41, 44 (2003) (“the consensus appears to be that drug
trafficking is usually a secondary interest compared to identity construction, protecting
neighborhood territory, and recreation,” treated herein as central characteristics of
property’s resilience functions). But see GEORGE W. KNOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO GANGS
636 (6th ed. 2006) (“Recall that a gang is a gang if and only if it engages in law violation
behavior, either individually or collectively.”).
10. This same idea has been explored in depth with respect to pirates. See generally
PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES (2009).
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traditional, sanctioned avenues for the production of resilience-generating
capital. This factual reorientation does not make street gangs any less
objectionable, but it does suggest that a just approach to gangs must reflect
this reality.
This article provides the foundation for one such approach, offering
a novel solution to the problems purportedly addressed by traditional
regulation of gangs. A more nuanced rendition of the policy suggestion
rudimentarily introduced above is this: Local governments should
compensate gang members for refraining from certain, otherwise lawful,
gang activity.
This gang compensation idea has both descriptive and prescriptive
foundations, drawing on property theory and the vulnerability thesis. Parts
II through IV set forth the descriptive claim of the article: Gangs are about
not crime, but the resilience to vulnerability that property affords people.
A key function of the contemporary gang is the creation, use, and
control of property.11 Gangs control territory;12 they communicate through
the use of clothing and other heraldic devices;13 they create intangible
assets on which they trade.14 These kinds of property are not merely
income generators. Rather, they are connected to and necessary for human
identity. This special category of “identity property” is uniquely situated
to allow individuals to respond to, compensate for, adapt to, and even
capitalize upon their vulnerability. That is, gangs are networked
institutions of resilience that arise within an alternative market, where
mainstream institutions and systems have failed to provide opportunities
to create enough identity property to adequately inure gang members and
their communities to their vulnerability. That insight frees anti-gang
strategies from the confines of the criminal law and criminal law proxies
and exposes social justice considerations not normally associated with
gang regulation.15
Vulnerability theory is central to this reinterpretation of gangs.
Vulnerability theory depathologizes vulnerability, recognizing that it is a
universal, constant characteristic of humans and their institutions.
Drawing on this insight, vulnerability theory—a rapidly developing
11. Lua Kamál Yuille, Blood In, Buyout: A Property & Economic Approach to Street
Gangs, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1119–1121 (2015).
12. See Olivier Bangerter, Territorial Gangs and Their Consequences for
Humanitarian Players, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 387, 396–97 (2010).
13. See KNOX, supra note 9, at 35–36; see also ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN & DONALD W.
KODLUBOY, GANGS IN SCHOOLS: SIGNS, SYMBOLS AND SOLUTIONS 33–34, 46 (1998).
14. James A. Densley, Under the Hood: The Mechanics of London’s Street Gangs
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, St. Antony’s College) (on file with author) (“Gang
value is based entirely on intangible assets, or what is known as ‘intellectual property’ in
legitimate markets.”).
15. Social justice considerations are central to the discourse on gang prevention.
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heuristic for addressing pressing socio-legal concerns—permits a deeper
and more authentic understanding of how people engage with each other
and their communities. It confronts “the reality that we all live and die
within a fragile materiality that renders us constantly susceptible to both
internal and external forces beyond our control” in order to demand what
the theory’s intellectual shepherd, Martha Albertson Fineman, calls the
“responsive state.” This responsive state is responsible for creating and
supporting structures and avenues of resilience—i.e. those resources that
allow individuals to confront, adapt to, ameliorate the consequences of,
compensate for, or contain the universal human condition.
Building on that descriptive base, Part V of this article suggests that
legal mechanisms that approach gangs as inescapably criminal are likely
to be ineffective. Gangs are recreating a traditional market-based identity
property, so the approach to the problems associated with them should
reflect that orientation. In the market that gangs mirror, actors are paid to
induce desired behavior. Such financial capital, and market institutions
themselves, constitute an “essential but incomplete antidote”16 to inherent
personal and institutional vulnerability.17 That is, they are a means for
individuals to “recover from harm or setbacks”—they provide resilience
to the vulnerability—all people face. A gang compensation strategy
replicates this market outcome in the gang context and could form part of
a comprehensive attack on gangs that is equally responsive to the crime
control imperative as it is to broad social justice concerns.
II.

STREET GANGS IN POPULAR LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The consensus appears to be that street gangs, defined narrowly,18 are
intractably pathological. The Federal Bureau of Investigation proclaims,
“[t]hey poison our streets with drugs, violence, and all manner of crime.”19

16. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP.
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 320 n.73 (2014) [hereinafter Fineman, LGBT Youth].
17. Id. (defining “resilience” as “the ability to become strong, healthy, or successful
again after something bad happens.”).
18. As has been my practice in previous work, this article limits its discussion to
contemporary, U.S.-based, street gangs for definitional, conceptual, and practical reasons.
While comparisons may be made among street gangs discussed here and U.S. prison gangs,
domestic and international organized criminal organizations (i.e. the mafia), and other
international and transnational gangs, those variations remain beyond the scope of the
present analysis. This distinction is consistent with the practice of a range of gang
observers. See, 2013 NATIONAL GANG REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8 (distinguishing among
street gangs, prison gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and other gangs by definition); see
also 2015 NATIONAL GANG REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-28 (treating separately street gangs,
prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs).
19. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 3.
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Gang members are “brutal outlaws,”20 complexly organized and deftly
managed to plague the moral, culture, and financial foundations of their
communities and threaten the futures of its children. Pronouncements
against gangs are stark: “Few people can truly grasp the lifestyle residents
of gang-dominated neighborhoods . . . must endure.”21 “The people of this
community are prisoners in their own homes . . . . The area is an urban war
zone.”22 “Residents kept their children locked indoors. Loud music, foul
language, and gunfire echoed in the streets. Sidewalks and garage doors
doubled as urinals. And citizens risked violent retaliation from gang
members if they complained to police about rampant drug dealing,
vandalism, and harassment.”23 “This is the same street gang that has
caused residents to remain indoors, to not allow their children to play
outdoors, and has prevented relatives from visiting.”24 “The United States
spends $20 billion a year treating the victims of gunshot wounds. ‘Gang
violence is not only tearing at our moral culture and killing our children,
it’s also picking our pockets.’”25
According to these accounts, gang members are terrorists. However,
this reflexive condemnation, should be understood in relation to the
ontological settlements that dominate and motivate the legal system.
A.

The Liberal Legal Subject

An atomistic conception of the rational, autonomous, liberal subject
dominates legal frameworks, generally and with respect to the
management of social deviance. “Western systems of law and justice have
inherited a political perspective that imagines a ‘liberal legal subject’ as
the ideal citizen—this subject is an autonomous, independent, and fullyfunctioning adult, who inhabits a world defined by individual, no societal
responsibility, where state intervention or regulation is perceived as a
violation of his liberty.”26 The liberal subject offers an image of the
20. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., FALSE PREMISE, FALSE PROMISE: THE
BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 (May 1997),
http://bit.ly/2Ethku9 (quoting then-Los Angeles City Attorney Hahn).
21. Keasa Hollister, Individual Autonomy Versus Community: Is It All or Nothing? An
Analysis of City of Chicago v. Morales, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 221, 254 (2000).
22. Arleen Jacobius, Court Approves Gang Injunctions, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 34,
34.
23. Julie Gannon Shoop, Gang Warfare: Legal Battle Pits Personal Liberty Against
Public Safety, TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 12, 12.
24. Philip Lee, Chapter 34: Hitting Criminal Street Gangs Where It Hurts—Their
Wallets, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 577, 577 (2008).
25. Silvia Perez, Alternatives in Fighting Street Gangs: Criminal Anti-Gang
Ordinances v. Public Nuisance Laws, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 619, 619 (2001).
26. Martha Albertson Fineman, Introducing Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY AND
THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK 1, 3 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Jonathan W.
Fineman eds., 2018) [hereinafter Fineman, Introducing Vulnerability].
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individual as fungorum more, sprung from the earth fully mature,
autonomous, self-sufficient, free, and independent.27 This ontological
commitment, essentially, presumes that each individual is born, raised,
and lives within the same empowering circumstances. This liberal subject
has individual legal rights and can use these rights to address inequality
and wrongs through the legal system.
When law “solicits the individual as the only relevant and wholly
accountable actor,”28 it is imperative that he be held responsible for his
own welfare. The “responsibilization” concomitant with the conception of
the liberal subject expects individuals take care of themselves, not depend
on the state to do so. Dependency—howsoever framed—is, therefore,
perceived as individual failure.29 The state’s role is limited to ensuring that
everyone is treated the same, in accordance with a formal vision of
equality. Indeed, “no public institution has to assist those who failed to
privately help themselves.”30
The liberal subject, spawned from an indelibly raced and gendered
socio-legal-economic milieu, is itself built in the image of an idealized,
unrealistic—mythological even—white male.31 Notwithstanding its
empirical falsity, the identification of the liberal subject with whitness and
maleness means that the ontological space in which the liberal subject is
presumptively situated is white and male. Thus, the proper role of the state
reflects primarily the realities, concerns, and values that exist within that
space.32
27. In his well-known mushroom simile, the influential English philosopher Thomas
Hobbes ideates socio-political institutions by “consider[ing] men as if even now [they]
sprung up out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without
all kind of engagement to each other.” THOMAS HOBBES, PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS
CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY (1651), reprinted in 2 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF
THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 1, 109 (William Molesworth ed., 1841).
28. WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION
133 (2015) (ebook).
29. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 31–34 (2005) [hereinafter FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH].
30. Hila Keren, Economizing Vulnerability: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 7 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
31. See Alexandria Timmer, A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court
of Human Rights, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR
LAW AND POLITICS 147, 149–50 (Martha Alberston Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013); see
also Lourdes Peroni & Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an
Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L.
1056, 1060 (2013).
32. The, often complementary, fields of critical race theory and feminist legal theory
provide expansive explorations of precisely the ways in which the legal system is raced
and gendered. The ways the liberal subject is also heteronormative, cis-normative,
secularly Christian, and bourgeois classed is far beyond the scope of the present discussion
is. For more on race and gender informed approaches to legal and socio-political analysis,
see generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
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The Pathological Gang Subject

Juxtaposed with the liberal subject, contemporary street gangs and
their members are inevitably characterized within popular legal
consciousness as intractably pathological.
The terroristic, modern image of the corporatized, mature, and
criminal street gang emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Preceding this
period, a complex and contested range of factors—notably alienation from
traditional labor markets that contracted then disappeared via
deindustrialization33—distorted established gang attrition patterns
associated with the end of adolescence.34 Facing sticky membership that
lacked economic opportunity, gangs evolved to meld entrepreneurial
exploits with the traditionally fraternal functions of the gang. By the
1990s, they were seen as networked organizations that demonstrated
significant geographic mobilization; increasingly engaged in lethal gun
violence; and relied on non-hierarchical, decentralized, and competitive
profit-driven enterprises.35
Today emblematized by the Crips and Bloods, originating in Los
Angeles, or the Latin Kings and Vice Lords, born in Chicago,36 these
“persistent”37 gangs are, moreover, comprised predominately of members
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012) (introducing the key concepts and methodology of critical
race theory); FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS,
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS (Martha Alberston Fineman et al. eds., 2009)
(anthologizing contemporary legal debates within, among, and across feminist and queer
theorists); AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991) (an early interdisciplinary exploration of
the ways law impacts the construction of women’s roles, identities, and rights); Franciciso
Valdes, Legal Reform and Social Justice – An Introduction to LatCrit Theory, Praxis and
Community, GRIFFITH L. REV. (2005) (providing an overview of a praxis centered approach
to race inflected scholarship).
33. See, e.g., Josh Sides, Straight into Compton: American Dreams, Urban
Nightmares, and the Metamorphosis of a Black Suburb, 56 AM. Q. 583, 593–94 (2004).
34. John M. Hagedorn, Gangs in Late Modernity, in GANGS IN THE GLOBAL CITY:
ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL CRIMINOLOGY 295, 301–05 (John M. Hagedorn ed., 2007).
35. See John M. Hagedorn, Race Not Space: A Revisionist History of Gangs in
Chicago, 91(2) J. OF AFR. AM. HIST. 194–208 (2006) [Hagedorn, Race Not Space].
36. For a description of these gangs, see for example, ALENJANDRO A. ALONSO,
TERRITORIALITY AMONG AFRICAN AMERICAN STREET GANGS IN LOS ANGELES (1999)
(published M.A. thesis, University of Southern California, UMI No. 1395119); R. D.
Flores, Crips and Bloods, 13 CRIME & JUSTICE INT’L 6, 6–9 (1997).
37. Frederic Thrasher inaugurated the scientific study of gangs with The Gang: A
Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago, his 1919–1926 study that raced gangs almost exclusively
as White ethnic (Irish, Italian, German, Polish, and Lithuanian) found them to be a natural,
interstitial feature of adolescence in predominantly poor, White ethnic enclaves.
Participation in these gangs led, over time, to integration in mainstream, legitimized social
institutions. See FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO
191–94 (Robert E. Park ed., 1927); see also John M. Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the PostIndustrial Era, in 24 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 365, 369 (Michael Tonry
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who are neither White nor proto-White.38 Instead, the contemporary gang
is perceived as being “made up largely of darker-hued ethnic groups,
especially African Americans and Latino Americans.”39
The entrepreneurial and fraternal characteristics of gangs mimic
closely the expectations of the responsibilization ethos of the liberal
subject, “under which subjects are reconfigured as self-investors and selfproviders and are expected to take care of themselves rather than expect
the state to do so.”40 However, as liberal subjects, gang members freely
and autonomously choose to pursue these self-care obligations illicitly.
The law presumes that liberal subjects face the same constellation of
opportunities. If the opportunities are not comparable in a way that
matters, then there is cognizable inequality that is remediable through
accessible legal mechanisms of which the liberal subject is obliged to avail
himself. In this analysis, the operation of race is invisible, irrelevant, and
noncognizable. This ontological posture decontextualizes and
dehistoricizes gangs, rendering them wholly pathological.41
III.

THE VULNERABLE SUBJECT IN A STREET GANG

The one-dimensional popular image of the contemporary gang
member is that of predatory drug terrorist.42 This view of street gangs

& Mark H. Moore eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hagedorn, Post-Industrial Era] (listing the
scientific studies of gang activity that Frederic Thrasher inaugurated); Louis Holland, Can
Gang Recruitment Be Stopped? An Analysis of the Social and Legal Factors Affecting Antigang Legislation, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 259, 267 (1995); James Diego Vigil, Urban Violence
and Street Gangs, 32 ANN. REV. ANTHRO. 225, 225 (2003) [hereinafter Vigil, Urban
Violence].
38. Vigil, Urban Violence, supra note 37, at 225–28.
39. Vigil, Urban Violence, supra note 37, at 225. The race perception of contemporary
gangs is inconsistent with empirical data. According to a 2006 survey, fourteen percent of
gang members are White, see MATTHEW D. O’DEANE, GANG INJUNCTIONS AND
ABATEMENT: USING CIVIL REMEDIES TO CURB GANG-RELATED CRIMES 155 (2012), and law
enforcement fails to categorize and treat as gangs many White gang-like organizations. See
Brian W. Ludeke, Malibu Locals Only: “Boys Will Be Boys,” or Dangerous Street Gang?
Why the Criminal Justice System’s Failure to Properly Identify Suburban Gangs Hurts
Efforts to Fight Gangs, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 309, 319–20 (2007); c.f. National Youth Gang
Survey
Analysis:
Demographics,
NAT’L
GANG
CTR.,
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis/Demographics#anchorregm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2019) (indicating that White people comprised closer to ten percent of
gangs from 1996–2011).
40. Keren, supra note 30, at 6.
41. For the purposes of the present discussion, gang level application of the liberal
subject as a behavioral heuristic is adequate. However, performing the same analysis with
respect to the commonly accepted antecedents of gang membership would yield the same
results.
42. Hagedorn, Postindustrial Era, supra note 37, at 366; KNOX, supra note 9, at 205.
This paper uses the term “terrorist” generally to describe those who cause terror, without
regard to whether they manifest the specific intent to incite fear or induce political change.
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dominates popular legal conscious and determines prevailing approaches
to the societal ills they represent or perpetuate. However, nearly a century
of sustained research tracing the evolution of American gangs,43 offers a
much more complex and nuanced understanding of their function. This
research demonstrates that the socio-cultural, political, and economic
functions of gangs as social actors and societal institutions is the
promotion and creation of a particularly important category of capital
referred to, here, as “identity property.”44
A.

The Vulnerable Subject

Vulnerability theory is an evolving paradigm introduced by Martha
Albertson Fineman.45 Recognizing the reality that “we are born, live, and
die within a fragile materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible”
to both internal and external forces beyond our control,46 its descriptive
foundation is that this vulnerability—i.e. “the concept that we are born
unable to protect ourselves, we become feeble with age, we must fear
natural disasters, and our social institutions might work against us”47—is
a fundamental and universal aspect of the human condition.
This version of vulnerability does not describe merely human
susceptibility to harm or danger.48 The fundamental characteristics of the
human condition should be uncontroversial: Humans are composed of
bone, flesh, and blood—material substances subject to the vagaries of the
physical environment. They are animated by complex psyches that react
43. For a review of this literature, see generally KNOX, supra note 9.
44. This term refers to that property that implicates one’s being more fully human, as
well as those property interests that impact one’s identity as such. For a full discussion and
development of the concept, see Yuille, supra note 11, at 1086, 1105 n. 326.
45. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1718–19 (2012); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619,
634–35 (2013); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality
in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman,
Anchoring Equality]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the
Responsive State, 60 EMORY L. J. 251, 267–70 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive
State]. For further examples of vulnerability theory, see generally VULNERABILITY:
REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 31;
Vulnerability and the Human Condition: Publications, EMORY UNIV.,
http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/resources/Publications.html (last vistited Dec. 14,
2018) (collecting resources regarding vulnerability theory).
46. Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 45, at 9.
47. Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93
N. C. L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2015); see also Michael Thomson, Bioethics & Vulnerability:
Recasting The Objects of Ethical Concern, 67 EMORY L.J. 1207, 1219 (“It is part of our
shared humanity that we all age and may be struck down by illness and natural or manmade disaster.”).
48. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 255.
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to internal and external phenomena. And, their lives are rooted in social,
economic, and political institutions and relationships through which they
manage the vocation of living.49 At birth, all humans are, in and of
themselves, defenseless. Advanced in age, they return (to greater or lesser
degrees) to that state. And, throughout their lives, humans are persistently
thrust into the position of dependence because of sickness, weather, childbearing, child-rearing, occupational displacement, institutional transition,
or any of an innumerable and often unpredictable amount of influences on
human life. This natural, unavoidable, and constant susceptibility is
vulnerability.50 As Fineman explains,
Human vulnerability arises from our embodiment, which carries with
it the imminent or ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and
misfortune . . . . Bodily harm can result from the unleashing of forces
of nature, from the mere passage of time, or from the fact that we
humans exist in a world full of often-unpredictable material realities.
While we can attempt to lessen risk or act to mitigate possible
manifestations of our vulnerability, the possibility of harm cannot be
eliminated.51

However,
people’s
fragile materiality—the fundamental
vulnerability of the human condition—is not merely a gross physical
descriptor. Vulnerability is equally a characteristic of the human mind,
human emotions, and human institutions. As a result of this universal and
constant condition, all people require protection, care, and support.52
This uncontroversial statement of the human condition
depathologizes vulnerability, which is rhetorically associated with
negative traits like poverty, dependence, otherness, and deficiency. As
articulated, here, vulnerability is not a problem (though it can have
negative or positive implications). It is not pathological. It is not a
temporally bounded status or a state. “[H]uman vulnerability is universal
and constant—there can be no position of invulnerability. Vulnerability IS
the human condition.”53 This understanding challenges propensity to
identify “vulnerable populations” as a specific and negatively stigmatized
49. Fineman describes these aspects of the human condition as embodiment and
embeddedness. See e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable
Inequality, 4 OSLO LAW REVIEW 133, 134 (2017) (“[A]s embodied beings, individual
humans find themselves dependent upon, and embedded within, social relationships and
institutions throughout the life-course.”).
50. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 251–75.
51. Id. at 267.
52. Dependence is most evident during periods of infancy, advanced age, and
infirmity, which “although episodic, [are] universally experienced.” Martha Albertson
Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609, 614 (2015)
[hereinafter Fineman, Restrained State].
53. Fineman, Introducing Vulnerability, supra note 26, at 4.
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subset of society.54 Rather, since vulnerability is a universal and constant
condition, all people require the care and support of others.
B.

Gangs as a Product of Vulnerability

The vulnerability framework, then, provides additional conceptual
tools to apply to street gangs. First, in contrast to the criminological view
of gang members as creators of vulnerability, the universality and
constancy of vulnerability makes clear that gang members are subjects of
vulnerability. Moreover, conceptualized as institutions of transgressive
capital creation, gangs themselves are depathologized. They simply
provide resources and support not otherwise available to its members.
Gangs are largely analogous to all other societal institutions, which are
designed to provide resources and support.
C.

Resilience as the Demand of Vulnerability Theory

The central innovation of Fineman’s approach is that dependency is
neither aberrant nor problematic. Dependency is not a liability. It is the
“compelling impetus for the creation of social relationships and
institutions.”55 The universal vulnerability of humans is what necessitates
“the formation of families, communities, associations, and even political
entities and nation-states.”56 At the same time, “institutions such as the
family . . . are unable to eliminate individual vulnerability and are
themselves vulnerable structures susceptible to harm and change.”57
The social institutions that people construct are designed to mitigate
human vulnerability and to provide individuals with resources and support
necessary to confront their vulnerability.58
The inescapability of vulnerability suggests that there is no state of
invulnerability; there is only the possibility of “resilience.”59 This
resilience is the accumulation of sufficient resources to allow individuals
to confront, adapt to, ameliorate, compensate for, or contain
vulnerability.60
54. Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of
Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 86 (2012) (“The designation of
vulnerable (inferior) populations reinforces and valorizes the ideal liberal subject, who is
positioned as the polar opposite of the vulnerable population. This liberal subject is thus
constructed as invulnerable, or at least differently vulnerable, and represents the desirable
and achievable ideals of autonomy, independence, and self-sufficiency.”).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 45, at 11.
58. Id.
59. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 270.
60. Id. at 269–70.
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Resilience has been defined in many ways. It is the ability to “bounce
back” and continue to function. It is predicting, preventing, and
minimizing the potentially disruptive consequences of vulnerability. It is
the accumulation of sufficient resources to allow individuals to confront,
adapt to, ameliorate, compensate for, or contain vulnerability.61
“Resilience is perceived as necessary to both confront life’s challenges and
to allow individuals to rise to take advantage of life’s opportunities and
enjoyments.”62 Moreover, unlike vulnerability, resilience is not an innate
condition.63 Instead, individuals accumulate the resources that confer
resilience over time and within and through social institutions and
relationships.64 Indeed, social institutions—families, communities,
associations, and political entities and nation-states—are designed to
mitigate human vulnerability by facilitating the accumulation of the
resources necessary to “bounce back” from the impacts of vulnerability.65
Thus, vulnerability theory can be framed as a social justice project
that mandates the building of resilience. Vulnerability theory does this
through the advancement of a “responsive state.” By continuously
monitoring, evaluating, updating, and reforming its institutions, a
responsive state provides and supports the institutions that help create such
resilience.66 The responsive state must alter institutional arrangements that
create resilience and privilege, while perpetuating disadvantage.
Vulnerability theory also frames discourse in terms of the “deficiencies of
institutions and the failure of state regulation rather than the deficiencies
and failures of individuals.”67
Unarguably, for gang members and, often, the marginalized
communities in which they are situated, the responsive state is absent.
Indeed, the state itself frequently serves to undermine the resilience
mechanisms that do exist. This leads to the capital deficits that are
correlated with gang membership and emergence. Without the sanctioned
resilience mechanisms, street gangs fill this function.

61. Id.
62. Jonathan Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work: A New Perspective on the
Employment At-Will Debate, 43 SW. L. REV. 275, 301 (2013).
63. Id. at 301–02.
64. Id.
65. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 269–70.
66. Id. at 274.
67. Fineman, LGBT Youth, supra note 16, at 311; see FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH,
supra note 29, at 264–65 (discussing systemic political corruption stemming from the
recalcitrance of vested interests towards disruptive programs and policies); see also
Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 45, at 15–19.
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THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF PROPERTY IN GANG
RESILIENCE

Through the lens of a vulnerable legal subject, a lack of resilience
most often is a function of unequal access to certain societal structures
and/or unequal allocations of privilege and power within those structures.
This conceptual reframing moves the analysis from dichotomizing
perpetrators and victims to recognizing gangs and their impacts on
communities as the failure of the state or a failure of institutional support.
A.

Gangs as Capital Generators

The interdisciplinary cohort of scholars that study gangs have
reached a consensus that violence, criminality, and entrepreneurialism are
secondary or tertiary undertakings of the types of gangs subject to gang
injunctions.68 Instead, these gangs tend to fill gaps that arise due to the
unavailability or inaccessibility of mainstream and legitimized forms of
what Pierre Bourdieu taxonomized as economic, social, cultural and
symbolic capital.69
Simply put, economic capital is material wealth.70 Cultural capital is
knowledge, skills, and cultural acquisitions (e.g. educational or technical
qualifications.)71 Social capital is comprised of social connections,
membership in social groups, or access to social networks.72 And,
symbolic capital is based on one’s “prestige, authority, and so on.”73 The
68. See KNOX, supra note 9, at 636–38 (citing sources exploring gang typologies).
69. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH
FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 243 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986) [hereinafter
Bourdieu, Forms of Capital]; see also Brenda C. Coughlin & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The
Urban Street Gang After 1970, 29 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 41, 44 (2003) (citing articles creating
a general “consensus” that identity construction is the primary function of gangs). For a
brief intellectual history of the “plethora of capitals,” see Michael Woolcock, Social
Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy
Framework, 27 THEORY & SOC’Y 151, 155 & n.19, 159–61 (1998).
70. Bourdieu, Forms of Capital, supra note 69, at 243.
71. Id. Cultural capital is further differentiated into subtypes: embodied, objectified
(e.g., physical cultural goods, like books), and institutionalized (e.g., institutional
recognition of such capital, like diplomas). Id. For Bourdieu, the neo-classical economic
concept of human capital most associated with Schultz (see, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz,
Investment in Human Capital, 51 American Economic Review 1, 1-17 (1961) (identifying
the phenomenon of human capital)) and Becker (see, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Investment in
Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 Journal of Political Economy 9, (1962)
(describing investment in human capital as “the imbedding of resources in people”), would
fall within this category.
72. Id. at 248–49 (“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”).
73. Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc Wacquant, Symbolic Capital and Social Classes, 13
Journal of Classical Sociology 292, 297 (2013).
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particular volume and composition of capital for an actor motivates that
actor’s actions towards particular types of goals and interests and
facilitates “social mobility.”74 Conversely, lack of access to capital (or
certain forms thereof) constrains the constellation of pursuits and interests
available to the individual or group experiencing the capital deficit.75
This brief review of Bourdieu’s capital taxonomy facilitates the
disaggregation of the interconnected licit and illicit roles a gang plays not
only in affected communities but also for its individual members.76
Criminological, legal, and political literature—documenting popular legal
consciousness—focuses on the illicit facets. For example, research
documents the ways contemporary gangs have evolved into vehicles of
economic capital growth by creating long-term opportunities for “financial
mobility” in response to alienation from and demotion in legitimate labor
markets.77
However, extensive evidence illustrates the ways that gangs are the
source of significant alternate cultural, social, and symbolic capital. There
are many theories of gang development and membership that frame these
capital contributions differently. For example, anomie or strain theory
posits that gangs form a delinquent subculture in response to “status
frustration” (i.e. opportunities to “succeed” as defined by mainstream
society are unavailable).78 Social disorganization posits that gangs form
when social institutions responsible for transmitting societal norms are
weak.79 “Multiple marginality” theory considers gangs the outcome of
marginalization at the multiple levels, integrating the cultural insights of
anomie theory, the ecological insights of social disorganization theory, as
well as key socioeconomic, historical, macrostructural, and social

74. See Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, supra note 69, at 252–55. Writing from a
neo-Marxist perspective, Bourdieu saw the motivational power of capital as distinctly in
line with traditional capitalist values.
75. See id. at 241–42.
76. See generally Kay Kei-Ho Pih et al., Different Strokes for Different Gangs? An
Analysis of Capital Among Latino and Asian Gang Members, 51 SOC. PERSPECTIVES 473
(2008) (providing a detailed discussion of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework). The
Bordieuian construct is not directly addressed in most relevant literature, but the
substantive insight is consistent with his capital taxonomy.
77. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of
a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances, 115 Q.J. OF ECON. 755, 755–56 (2000). Moderate success
achieved with respect to economic capital, in turn, permits gang involvement to serve as a
substitute for acquisition of legitimized human capital through education and training. See,
e.g., Pih et al., supra note 76, at 484–85.
78. See, e.g., SCOTT H. DECKER & BARRIK VAN WINKLE, LIFE IN THE GANG: FAMILIES,
FRIENDS, AND VIOLENCE 7–8 (1996).
79. See, e.g., Irving A. Spergel and G. David Curry, The National Youth Gang Survey:
A Research and Development Process, in THE GANG INTERVENTION HANDBOOK 359, 383–
86 (Arnold P. Goldstein & C. Ronald Huff eds., 1993).
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psychological theories of gang formation.80 Complementing these
institutional explanations, individual antecedents of gang membership are
generally thought to include environmental and personal vulnerabilities
like living in socially disorganized areas, weak family structures, low or
failing educational expectations or achievement, and association with
deviant peers or family.81
The common insight of these viewpoints is their diagnosis of the
disjunction between mainstream sources of capital and the alternatives
produced by gangs.82 “Linguistic capital” provides a good example.
Underclass youth, who participate in street gangs at higher rates than other
youth, demonstrate deficits in their use of standard language patterns (i.e.
speaking standard English) because they are excluded from social
networks that value linguistic capital.83 Exclusion from social networks
results in social capital deficits that reinforce labor market and educational
obstacles. Those obstacles, in turn, further reduce economic and cultural
capital. This creates cyclical obstacles to acquiring social capital.84 Gangs
respond to these deficits by developing distinctive gang vernaculars85 that
provide entry-level access to avenues for the acquisition of what can be
called “gang capital,” which is capital having value in the normative
spaces gangs create.
The creation and exchange of gang capital is, generally, connected to
and supported by the financial capital most gangs develop through illicit
channels. However, the most gang capital is created and exchanged
through expressly legal or unregulated means. A gang’s main focus is not
the creation of financial capital; it is the provision of surrogate sources of
identity solidarity. Such identity becomes a valuable resource because the
gang fills gaps left by other socio-cultural institutions.86 This gap filling
80. See, e.g., James Diego Vigil, A Multiple Marginality Framework of Gangs, in THE
MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6, at 20, 20–29.
81. Terence P. Thornberry et al., The Antecedents of Gang Membership, in THE
MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6, at 30, 31–33.
82. James Diego Vigil, Group Processes and Street Identity: Adolescent Chicano
Gang Members, 16 ETHOS 421, 426 (1988).
83. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 46–65 (John B.
Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991).
84. Prudence L. Carter, ‘‘Black’’ Cultural Capital, Status Positioning, and Schooling
Conflicts for Low-Income African American Youth, 50 SOC. PROBLEMS 136, 136–55
(2003).
85. See generally RUSSELL D. FLORES, GANG SLANGING: A COLLECTION OF WORDS
AND PHRASES USED BY GANG MEMBERS (2d ed. 1998) (detailing common gang vernacular);
Nat’l Gang Crime Research Ctr., The Gang Dictionary: A Guide to Gang Slang, Gang
Vocabulary, and Gang Sociolinguistic Phrases, J. GANG RES., Summer 1997, at 66 (same).
86. See, e.g., Deborah Lamm Weisel, The Evolution of Street Gangs: An Examination
of Form and Variation in THE MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6 at 94-95 (describing
the individual and group rewards associated with gang membership); Felix Padilla, The
Working Gang in THE MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6 at 142-143 (describing the
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results in the formation of a shared normative community (distinct from
the mainstream normative community in which gang members are
situated) in which alternative gang capital has purchase and cachet:
“Gangs represent the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for
themselves where none adequate to their needs exists.”87
Gangs engage in a range of activities, the core function of which is
the pursuit of identity formulation and capital creation. However, the most
salient of those activities is gangs’ use of the colors, signs, and symbols.88
The display of gang symbols through hand signs and unique identifying
graffiti communicates a gang’s presence in and claim of dominance over
a geographic space.89 The borders of a gang’s geographic territory are
clearly charted by its distinctive graffiti.90 By deploying a gang’s
symbols—wearing distinctive clothing and colors, physically marking
their body with gang tattoos, incorporating gang symbols into their
personal belongings, and adopting gang vernacular—members occupy
space in the community’s consciousness. This performance, in turn,
accords the gangs respect and status within the physical space to which
they lay claim.
Gang symbology is symbiotically connected to gang territoriality.
Gangs create physical and psychological territories in which their identity
has normative force. The capital associated with that identity has positive
value. Gang territoriality itself is also a key aspect of the development of
gang capital.91 Most gang activity is at least indirectly related to such
territoriality. For example, gangs physically occupy public and private
spaces in their claimed geographic territory to reinforce the symbolic
territorial markings of graffiti.92 Within secured territories,93 gang
members often perform traditional functions of owners. They determine

development of a “gang culture” as the response to shared conditions); Beth Caldwell,
Criminalizing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-Legal Critique of Gang Injunctions, 37 Am. J.
Crim. L. 241, 260-62 (2010) (arguing that gangs are the product of social marginalization).
87. See, e.g., THRASHER, supra note 37, at 37.
88. KNOX, supra note 9, at 35–36; see also GOLDSTEIN & KODLUBOY, supra note 13,
at 33–52.
89. GOLDSTEIN & KODLUBOY, supra note 13, at 34–40.
90. See generally David Ley & Roman Cybriwsky, Urban Graffiti as Territorial
Markers, 64 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 491 (1974).
91. This is evidenced, for example, in by the sheer number of gangs whose names are
related to the geographic territory they claim. Bangerter, supra note 12, at 396.
92. See generally, P. Jeffrey Brantingham et al., The Ecology Of Gang Territorial
Boundaries, 50 Criminology 851 (2012); Karen L. Adams & Anne Winter, Gang Graffiti
as a Discourse Genre, 1 Journal of Sociolinguistics 337–360 (1997).
93. In unstable or contested spaces, territorial claims may be enforced (or charted)
through force.
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access. They control markets. They perform protective functions for
community members.94 They disaggregate, cede, and transfer their claims.
Decentering the predatory criminality and violence with which gangs
are associated reveals a view of gangs in which they value and desire
access to conventional sources of capital.95 With standard avenues of
capital acquisition obstructed, unavailable, or inaccessible, they create
alternatives. This enriched framing of gangs grounded in available and
accepted empirical and qualitative data, aligns with the capital deficit
formulation advanced above and creates a link to a growing body of legal
literature focused on human vulnerability.
B.

Property Corollaries to Vulnerability Theory

The preceding section recast the central function of gangs as the
production, reproduction, and protection of resilience through the
generation of capital. This idea has clear corollaries and antecedents within
a diverse body of property perspectives. Even though the concept has not
been characterized in these terms, a central function of property is that the
accumulation of property allows individuals to confront, adapt to,
ameliorate, compensate for, or recover from the consequences of their
vulnerability. To illustrate this idea, it serves to consider several salient
examples.
In The New Property,96 Charles A. Reich described property as
“guard[ing] the troubled boundary between individual man and the
state,”97 concluding that it facilitated the individual’s ability to control his
own life.98 Reich’s controversial descriptive and prescriptive claims
operationalized the idea that property cannot be understood outside of its
social context. Property is a deliberate social construct that can be wielded
to promote societal interests.99
94. George Knox cites gangs that have implemented litter clean up regimes, organized
community social events, and doled out largess to incapacitated members. Knox also
reports that host community members themselves may solicit the gang’s exercise of such
ownership functions. KNOX, supra note 9, at 23–25, 32.
95. Scott H. Decker & Janet L. Lauritsen, Leaving the Gang, in THE MODERN GANG
READER, supra note 6, at 60, 65.
96. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
97. Id. at 733. Reich’s definition of property aligns with the in rem/property-as-things
definition. Id. at 739 (“A man who has property has certain legal rights with respect to an
item of wealth.”).
98. Id. at 733. Reich later argued that his interest was to collapse the distinction among
the constitutional categories of “life, liberty, and property,” which is as least implicitly a
key insight of classical liberal thought. Id. at 771-74.
99. Property as a social construct has clear classical antecedents. See, e.g., DAVID A.
SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 19 (1992) (describing Sir
William Blackstone’s view of property as “a conventional institution created by law, habit,
or the passage of time . . . . [The] rules prescribing its use and transfer were determined by
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Beginning with Property and Personhood,100 Margaret Jane Radin
asserted, “to achieve proper self-development—to be a person—an
individual needs some control over resources in the external
environment.”101 The purpose of property rights, then, is to secure such
control.102 Thus, property that is “important to the freedom, identity, and
contextuality of people”103 is a fundamental category that deserves greater
legal protection.104 Radin explained,
Where we can ascertain that a given property right is personal, there is
a prima facie case that that right should be protected to some extent
against invasion by government and against cancellation by conflicting
fungible property claims of other people. This case is strongest where
without the claimed protection of property as personal, the claimants’
opportunities to become fully developed persons in the context of our
society would be destroyed or significantly lessened, and probably also
where the personal property rights are claimed by individuals who are
maintaining and expressing their group identity.105

Eduardo Peñalver explained how property rights are fundamental to
the constitution of communities.106 It is well established that property is a
necessary and useful concept only in a community context. “In the world

society.”); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 248 (1990) (“[P]roperty is, of all the basic rights, perhaps most
obviously the creation of the state.”).
100. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
[hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood]. Though the discussion here relies primarily
on Property and Personhood, Radin has refined, developed, and evolved her theory of
property in a series of well-recognized articles and books. See generally Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, Liberal Conception of Property];
MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) (ebook); MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in
Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 (1996).
101. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 100, at 957.
102. An alternative construction of that control focuses on the control of the social
relations connected to an object—the relationship among individuals—rather than the
particular connection a person has to the object itself. This tracks Radin’s insights from her
distinctly in rem understanding of property to a relational understanding thereof. See Lisa
M. Austin, Person, Place, or Thing? Property and the Structuring of Social Relations, 60
U. TORONTO L.J. 445 (2010). This interesting alignment of Radin’s theory does not change
its underlying import.
103. Radin, Liberal Conception of Property, supra note 100, at 1686. Radin calls this
property for personhood. Id. at 1687.
104. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 100, at 1014–15.
105. Id.
106. See generally Eduardo Peñalver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889
(2005).
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of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role.”107 However, Peñalver’s
insight advances a different proposition: property is “an institution that
binds individuals together into normative communities.”108 Peñalver calls
this idea “property as entrance.”109
The normative underpinnings of property as entrance are anchored in
an Aristotelian community theory of property advanced by Peñalver and
Gregory Alexander.110 That theory conceives of people as social and
political animals inherently dependent and interdependent on other people
to develop the uniquely “human capacities” necessary for “human
flourishing,” 111 a rich concept that “must include at least the capacity to
make meaningful choices among alternative life horizons.”112 That
capacity justifies the value and effort invested in individual autonomy.113
In the communitarian framework, property facilitates access to the human
networks that allow an individual to become fully human.114
Such community access, however, is mediated by the socio-cultural
meanings attached to property.115 Among the denominative or expressive
functions of property is its ability to signal the status of the property owner
in the community. Nestor Davidson has explored the manifestation of this
107. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
347 (1967).
108. Peñalver, supra note 106, at 1972.
109. Id. passim.
110. See generally ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY
(2012) (ebook). Alexander has elaborated this concept of community. See generally
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (2006).
111. Without providing an exhaustive analysis of the “well-lived life” implied by
human flourishing, Peñalver and Alexander broadly include at least four capabilities
necessary to the pursuit thereof: life, freedom, practical reason, and affiliation. ALEXANDER
& PEÑALVER, supra note 110, at 89–90.
112. Id. at 88. They further explain the contours of “meaningful” decision-making
within a robust conception of freedom as including both the ability to discern the “salient
differences” among choices and “deliberate deeply” about their relative value. Id. For an
elaboration of this idea in the property context, see generally Colin Crawford, The Social
Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089
(2011).
113. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 110, at 87.
114. Alexander and Peñalver’s prescriptive conclusion asserts that their
communitarian/human flourishing analysis provides a valuable heuristic for resolving
property questions. Id. at 92–97. León Duguit’s view of property as a social function in
service of community solidarity reaches a more rigid conclusion that property should only
be protected where it fulfills this social function. See Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla,
The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003,
1004–07 (2011).
115. Jeffrey Douglas Jones advances the importance of socio-cultural meaning to
suggest that the relevant unit of analysis is the way property advances specific
“sociocultural meanings grounded in specific object relationships” rather than property for
personhood. Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST
J.L. & POL’Y 93, 127–31 (2011).
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role on several levels.116 In its thin form, the expressive function of
property is to denote the relationship of a party to a valuable resource and/
or the relationship of several parties to each other with respect to that
resource. 117 Property’s thick expressive role is to shape and reinforce the
economic, social, and cultural hierarchies that define mutual obligations
and set the borders of social relations.118 The type, volume, and
composition of an individual’s ownership situates that individual
horizontally and vertically in the social order.119 Thus, property not only
constitutes communities, it orders them.
C.

Property & Resilience

None of these authors has engaged either gangs or vulnerability
theory in the ways suggested here. However, the applicability of these
concepts is intuitive. Like all people, gang members face acute
institutional, economic, and physic vulnerability. Indeed, the dominant
view is that gangs are caused by the absence or breakdown of community
institutions (e.g. family, school, church and local government). These
institutions transmit mainstream social norms that enable individuals to
better respond to the consequences of their vulnerability. These norms take
the form of capital, or resources that individuals use to facilitate either their
acquisition of additional capital or social mobility. Thoroughly excluded
from meaningful access to one system capital, gangs have created their
own parallel system in which they are able not only to acquire capital that
is valuable within that parallel system but also attempt to compel their
admittance into the mainstream system. Gangs, then, fill an institutional
gap by providing avenues to pursue the kinds of capital to which the gangs
members have limited access. The accumulation of this capital, or identity
property, lessens the risk posed by and mitigates the impact of gang
vulnerability.
This ability to manage the consequences of vulnerability is resilience.
So, membership in the gang facilitates resilience.

116. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 757 (2009).
117. These are the alternative basic definitions of property that are often the core of the
property theory debate. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
118. Davidson, supra note 116, at 771–74.
119. This function clearly correlates to the Bourdieuian idea of capital facilitating social
mobility. See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. Davidson explores the connection
between social mobility and property with respect to implications of stability and instability
in the institution of property and how the law can or should be used to influence those
implications. Davidson, supra note 116, at 807–10.
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PAID INJUNCTIONS AS RESILIENCE

The preceding discussion reframed the contemporary American
street gang as a mechanism for the generation of resilience to which its
members turn when mainstream or sanctioned mechanisms of resilience
are deficient or inadequate. An important implication flows from
renvisioning gangs in this way: If gangs generate resilience, then the tools
that are deployed to dismantle gangs necessarily impede the development
of that resilence.
This part describes the basic gang injunction, an important tool that
law enforcement has developed to respond to gangs that has resilience
defeating consequences. Then, accepting that vulnerability theory’s
demand for the responsive state makes this approach to gangs indefensible,
it suggests the paid injunction as the responsive state alternative to the
standard approach.
A.

Prevailing Anti-Gang Strategies

The social crises that catalyzed120 the changes in street gangs that
earned their contemporary reputation121 came at a moment in politicaleconomic history in which investing public resources in the underlying
causes of the street gang problem was patently untenable.122 At the same
historical moment, so-called “tough on crime” law enforcement models
were proving inadequate in a legal context that had disapproved of
120. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan, The Social Organization of Drug Use and Drug
Dealing Among Urban Gangs, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 633, 635, 661–62 (1989); Vigil, Urban
Violence, supra note 37, at 225–242; John M. Hagedorn, Gangs as Social Actors, in THE
ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY READER 141, 145–47 (Stuart Henry & Mark M. Lanier, eds.,
2006); Hagedorn, Post-Industrial Era, supra note 37, at 457–511;
121. Specifically, (1) the impact of post-industrial era in working class urban; and
suburban minority communities, see, e.g., Sides, supra note 33, at 583–605; and (2) the
introduction and popularization of crack cocaine, see, e.g., Jeff Grogger & Michael Willis,
The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates, 82 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 519, 519 (2000); Janet L. Dolgin, The Law’s Response to Parental Alcohol and
“Crack” Abuse, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1222 (1991); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the
Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates,
5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 646–47 (2000) (citing James A. Inciardi, Beyond Cocaine:
Basuco, Crack, and Other Coca Products, 14 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 461, 482 (1987));
Hagedorn, Race Not Space, supra note 35, at 194–208.
122. That is, the contemporary political and economic priorities—which Hila Keren,
supra note 30, now describes as neoliberalism’s responsibilization fetish—did not include
and, in fact, expressly rejected funding non-criminal approaches to social disorder. See
generally CHRISTOPHER PIERSON, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE? 143–52 (3rd ed. 2006)
(providing a detailed evolution of critiques of government financial support of the health
and well-being of poor people); Irving A. Spergel, Youth Gangs: An Essay Review, 66 SOC.
SERV. REV. 121, 121–22 (1992)(describing central factors in the lack of political support
for youth services and gang prevention, including fragmentation of social service labor and
the popularity of political conservatism).

486

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:2

traditional order and maintenance policing.123 Local governments and law
enforcement agencies have responded to the plague of gangs predictably,
developing creative initiatives they claim disrupt or eliminate gangs. Most
experimentation has focused on variations on traditional policing. For
example, jurisdictions criminalized gang membership, 124 created
specialized “gang units” within police departments, and targeted
heightened surveillance operations against gang leaders.125 However,
political actors also turned to civil legal mechanisms to combat the
growing, intractable menace.126
Chicago’s juvenile street gangs were the first to be studied
systematically127 and remain a mine for important data on the functioning
of contemporary gangs.128 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the most wellknown experimentation in gang control mechanisms was developed and
deployed in Chicago. In 1992, the city passed its Gang Congregation
Ordinance. Notwithstanding well-settled case law indicating that loitering
statutes were unconstitutional,129 the prophylactic anti-gang loitering
ordinance gave police broad discretion to disperse any group of two or
more people who were in a public place “with no apparent purpose” if one
of the individuals was “suspected” of being a gang member.130 Failure to
123. So-called “order-maintenance policing” is characterized by the broad delegation
of discretionary power to local police to “keep the peace” (read: enforce community norms
of decency and aesthetics) through a constellation of tools that include the informal
exercise of authority, as well as the power to arrest individuals for relatively minor offenses
(e.g. “breaching the peace”, “suspicion,” loitering, and vagrancy) that exist at least
primarily to provide the police with tools to remove undesirable persons from public
spaces. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1,
8 (2004); Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at Its Word: A Defense of the Use
of Anti-Gang Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47, 51–53 (1999). But see Ryan Young,
Sharpen the Blade: Void for Vagueness and Service of Process Concerns in Civil Gang
Injunctions, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2009); Sides, supra note 33, at 583–60;
David R. Truman, The Jets and Sharks are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal
Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 686–90 (1995).
124. For example, California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act not
only criminalizes gang participation, but also permits enhancements for more than thirty
felonies when committed by a gang member. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.21, 654 (West
2018).
125. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see Eva Rosen & Sudhir Venkatesh, Legal
Innovation and the Control of Gang Behavior, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 258 (2007).
126. Id.
127. See generally THRASHER, supra note 37.
128. Louis Holland, Can Gang Recruitment be Stopped? An Analysis of the Social and
Legal Factors Affecting Anti-gang Legislation, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 259, 267 (1995);
Hagedorn, Postindustrial Era, supra note 37, at 369.
129. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1, 165–71 (1972)
(declaring unconstitutionally vague a vagrancy ordinance which included loitering, defined
as “wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object.”).
130. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47 n.2 (1999).
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disperse on command could result in arrest, fines up to $500, and six
month’s imprisonment.131 The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
ordinance in 1999;132 however, its passage and the wave of emulation it
prompted are illustrative of local government perspectives and
approaches. 133
Joint innovation efforts in Southern California, whose gang presence
earned internationally notoriety during the 1980s and 1990s, resulted in a
civil anti-gang strategy that has withstood judicial review.134 The path to
the gang injunction began with “single situs” property abatements,135
which are injunctions that target one parcel of private property as a
nuisance because it serves as a gang fortress, where gang members
congregate, deal drugs, and engage in other gang activity. Pursuant to the
property abatement, gang members and associates are subject to stay away
131. Id.
132. Id. at 64 (finding unconstitutionally vague an ordinance prohibiting gang members
from loitering that failed to enumerate a comprehensive definition of “loiter” and left
determination of gang membership to ad hoc police discretion). For a discussion of the
mechanism at issue in Morales and relevant critiques, see generally Lawrence Rosenthal,
Gang Loitering and Race, 91 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 99 (2000); Kim Strosnider, AntiGang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness
Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101 (2002);
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197 (1998); Albert W. Alschuler
& Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to
Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (1998); Debra Livingston, Gang
Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 162
(1999). The U.S. Supreme Court has not considered gang injunctions, but, as imposed in
California, it is clear that they are distinguishable from the Chicago ordinance with respect
to the constitutional infirmities considered in Morales. See Walston, supra note 123, at 51–
53. But see Young, supra note 123, at 1004.
133. See generally Meares & Kahan, supra note 132 (primarily discussing anti-gang
ordinances, but drawing connections among other strategies, including gang injunctions);
Strosnider, supra note 132.
134. The future viability of the gang injunction is not clear, as several municipalities
have experienced significant community resistance to their deployment. Civil rights
organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, continue to challenge the
mechanisms as unconstitutional. At least partially in response to such criticism, in 2017,
the city of Los Angeles removed more than two thousand individuals from its various gang
injunctions. James Queally, Thousands freed from L.A. gang injunctions that controlled
their movements, friendships, even dress choices, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://lat.ms/2QPCA2U.
135. Cheryl L. Maxson, Karen Hennigan, David Sloane & Kathy A. Kolnick, Can Civil
Gang Injunctions Change Communities? A Community Assessment Of The Impact Of Civil
Gang Injunctions 3 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 208345.pdf (citing
Deanne Castorena, The History Of The Gang Injunction In California (1998) (unpublished
report by the Hardcore Gang Division, Office of the District Attorney, County of Los
Angeles)). The program in place in Southern California is described in Jonathan Cristall &
Liora Forman-Echols, Property Abatements–The Other Gange Injunction: Project
T.O.U.G.H., NAT’L GANG CTR. BULL. (Sept. 2009), https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/
content/documents/project-tough.pdf.
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orders prohibiting them from returning to the property, while owners,
tenants and managers are required to take comprehensive action to prevent
gang activity.136 If the nuisance is not abated, the property may be seized
and sold.137
Within a decade, single situs abatements had given way to the much
broader injunctive relief afforded by the gang injunction.138 This
distinctive feature of the gang prevention and criminal law enforcement
arsenal takes the form of a standard injunction.139 In their standard form,
gang injunctions claim that the conduct of named gangs, as unincorporated
entities—not specific individuals140—constitutes a public nuisance under
California law, which has both civil and penal components.141 As a civil
offense, “[a]nything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property” constitutes
a nuisance.142 A nuisance becomes public when it “affects at the same time
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons,”143 and it becomes criminal when it has a distinctively public
quality.144 The broad nuisance abatement actions have been deployed
136. For example, the owner may be required to install security systems or make
physical alterations to the property (like increasing lighting or installing fences) to prevent
gang activity and, in leased property, implement changes to management, tenant-screening
proceedings. If necessary, tenant evictions may be ordered.
137. Jonathan Cristall & Liora Forman-Echols, Property Abatements–The Other
Gange Injunction: Project T.O.U.G.H., NAT’L GANG CTR. BULL. 4–6, 10–12 (Sept. 2009),
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/content/documents/project-tough.pdf. The technical
process of property abatement is more complicated, and sale and seizure is a remedy of last
resort, that follows the closure of the property and imposition of liens, and other
intermediate sanctions designed to incentivize abatement.
138. O’DEANE, supra note 39, at 441–49.
139. Cheryl L. Maxson et al., For the Sake of the Neighborhood? Civil Gang Injunction
as a Gang Intervention Tool in Southern California, in POLICING GANGS AND YOUTH
VIOLENCE 239, 245–49, 260–62 (Scott H. Decker ed., 2003) [hereinafter Maxson et al.,
Sake of the Neighborhood] (detailing the ways the mechanism defies simple categorization
in the gang intervention typology proposed by Spergel and Curry, supra note 79).
140. A key component of gang injunctions is their reliance on California’s “timehonored equitable practice applicable to labor unions, abortion protestors or other
identifiable groups” of pursuing equitable remedies against identifiable groups (regardless
of their incorporation status) because “such groups can act only through the medium of
their membership.” To effect this principle, at least some specific gang members are named
as representatives of the named gang. Then, the gang, through those representatives (and
other gang member who steps forward to speak for the gang), is given the opportunity to
challenge the injunction, generally, and its particular provisions, specifically, according to
procedures applicable to any other civil injunction. The named gang members may also
challenge their inclusion in the proposed injunction. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929
P.2d 596, 617 (Cal. 1997).
141. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479–3480 (West 2018).
142. Id. § 3479 (specifically including drug dealing).
143. Id. § 3480.
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 2018).
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against gangs to target conduct not otherwise prohibited in California
Penal Code, 145 and the broad definition was crafted to flexibly cover the
full range of behaviors in which gang members might engage publicly. In
addition to unlawful and criminal conduct, gang injunctions typically
enjoin:
(1) standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering, bicycling or
otherwise appear in the public view with any known gang
member;
(2) possessing tools or objects “capable” of defacing real or personal
property (i.e. pens);
(3) blocking the free passage of any person or vehicle;
(4) confronting, intimidating, harassing, annoying, provoking any
residents or patrons or visitors to the target area;146
(5) knowingly being present in a vehicle found to have contraband,
drugs or illegal weapons;147
(6) acting as a lookout and signaling in any manner to other persons
the approach of the police;
(7) using words, phrases, physical gestures or symbols (i.e. gang
signs), or engaging in other forms of communication that describe
or refer to the gang;
(8) wearing gang clothes; and
(9) making loud noise of any kind, including yelling or loud music, at
any time of day or night.148

Gang injunctions have been deployed with considerable variation.149
Some jurisdictions use injunctions to reduce the number of gang members
on the street at any given moment by performing gang sweeps.150 Other
jurisdictions report that police officers “get more mileage from the gang
145. EDWARD L. ALLAN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF POLICING BY INJUNCTION 63 (2004).
146. Notice that since these are civil actions, many provisions, like this one, require no
mens rea. Id. at 71.
147. LOS ANGELES CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE: CRIMINAL AND SPECIAL LITIGATION
BRANCH, GANG INJUNCTION GUIDELINES (2007) at 27 http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digitallibrary/resource_1317.pdf.
148. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 617 (Cal. 1997).
149. See, e.g. Management Audit of the Civil Gang Injunctions, in 2003–2004 LOS
ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 223–24 (2004),
http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/gjury03-04/LACGJFR_03-04.pdf (describing differential
deployment between the city and county of Los Angeles).
150. See O’DEANE, supra note 39, at 71 (describing the systematic “catch and release”
of gang members).
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injunctions by using them as a negotiating tool to gain information on the
streets.”151 Gang injunctions also impose indirect but significant practical
consequences on injunctees that are unrelated to the enforcement of the
gang injunction. Being enjoined, for example, is included on a standard
background check,152 which limits injunctees’ access to legitimate
employment and both public and private housing.
Gang injunctions are intuitively compelling. They are responsive to
the characteristics of the historical moment in which they arose that
rendered conventional law enforcement strategies impracticable and
relatively cost effective. Further, the savings associated with them are
reinforced by the heightened community surveillance that gang
injunctions permit. Moreover, proponents claim, this heightened
surveillance creates deterrent reverberations at no additional enforcement
cost. Through that heightened surveillance, which is explicitly sanctioned
for injunctees and implicitly supported for the wider safety zone
population, law enforcement is able to bypass much of the constitutional
criminal procedural strictures and redeploy the flexibility and discretion to
strategically target delinquent youth for the types of behavior that was the
object of historical order-maintenance policy.153 Gang injunctions are also
responsive to the “tough on crime” political climate by communicating
absolute intolerance for gangs and by narrowly circumscribing the liberty
of perceived criminals.154
The gang injunction example is apt for the present discussion.
However, the full range of traditional law enforcement techniques and
special initiatives that reflect popular legal consciousness centers on gangs
as wholly criminal institutions engaged in terminally violent conduct to
advance financial objectives. The force of this perspective can be seen in
the response to legal challenges to these types of innovations. The
successful challenge to Chicago’s gang loitering ordinance rested on its
focus on loitering, which is by definition an innocuous act and by
implication not a tool of gang terrorists.155
In contrast, California-style gang injunctions survive First
Amendment challenges because the expression and association of gangs
has the illicit purpose of furthering a criminal enterprise, which falls into
the constitutionally unprotected category of behaviors that do not express
some political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultural

151. Id.
152. See Lindsay Crawford, Comment, No Way Out: An Analysis of Exit Processes for
Gang Injunctions, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 161, 179–80 (2009).
153. See Walston, supra note 123, at 51.
154. See id. at 53.
155. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 50 (1999).
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viewpoint and which are not conferred First Amendment protection.156
Gang association and speech is criminal association and speech.
The Equal Protection clause of the Constitution prohibits invidious
distinction based on protected characteristics, like race. Challenges to
gang injunctions on this ground are untenable because gangs expressly
enjoined because of their proven record of causing criminal public
nuisances, not because of their race or status.157 Again, definitionally,
gangs are criminal.158
At least with respect to gang members, then, the gang injunction
should be expected to heighten the risks posed by and exacerbate the
impact of vulnerability. Gang injunction assessments have born out this
expectation. Beth Caldwell concluded that injunctions reinforce gang
membership by exacerbating key marginality indicators across different
scales.159 That is, gang injunctions render injunctees less able to access
mainstream, legitimized mechanisms of resilience, like lawful
employment. Similarly, Joan Howarth demonstrates that gang injunctions
distinguish antagonistic categories of gang members versus community
members, which are completely separated and in opposition. These silohs,
in turn, solidify gang exclusion from the community.160 For both Caldwell
and Howarth, gang injunctions excise actual and suspected gang members
from communities in ways that further destabilize mainstream resilience
development and distribution,161 while the concomitant heightened
community surveillance perpetuates rather than undermines social
influence factors that contribute to gang emergence.162
B.

Paid Injunctions

This article maintains that street gangs are best understood as
engaged in transgressive property creation and reinterpretation that
156. Walston, supra note 123, at 69.
157. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics,
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2004); O’DEANE, supra note 39, at 157–58.
158. See also 2015 NATIONAL GANG REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (defining street gangs
as “criminal organizations that formed on the street and operate in neighborhoods”).
159. Beth Caldwell, Criminalizing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-Legal Critique of Gang
Injunctions, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241, 262-70 (2010).
160. Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice
Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 73436 (2000).
161. In the general criminal context, Meares has problematized the tendency of
incarceration to produce the same results. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 699 (1998); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug
Law Enforcement, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 191, 223-26 (1998).
162. Terence R. Boga, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for
Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 477, 460-61 (1993).
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provides alternative sources of resilience both to gang members and, often,
to the communities in which gangs are sited. It would be possible to take
this recasting of street gangs using the vulnerability heuristic as an
opportunity to reject the consensus that gangs are bad. However, this
article follows a less radical path.
[W]hen vulnerability is understood as a universal constant, the
question is not, “Who is more or less vulnerable?” – because again, we
are all vulnerable. The question instead becomes, “Who is more or less
resilient and how did they get that way?” Understanding this inequality
of resilience is at the heart of vulnerability theory, because it is through
social institutions . . . that we develop our resilience over the course of
our lives. Through the lens of the liberal legal subject, a lack of
resilience can be deemed an individual failing. You made a mistake . . .
. But through the lens of a vulnerable legal subject, a lack of resilience
most often is a function of unequal access to certain societal structures
and/or unequal allocations of privilege and power within those
structures.163

Thus, even accepting the proposition that gangs are bad, what this
reframing should mean for an anti-gang strategy remains a relevant
inquiry.
As sketched above, gang injunctions prohibit members of specified
gangs from engaging in a wide range of otherwise lawful activities through
which gangs generate the property interests that provide resilience to
gangs. So, wearing clothes in gang colors, appearing in public with a gang
member, carrying a writing utensil, and many other acts are prohibited and
effectively criminalized by gang injunctions.164 Recall, the antecedents to
gang membership and the situs of gangs is linked to the inadequacy of
traditional mechanisms for building resilience for gang members and the
communities in which they live.165 Gangs confer on their members both
privilege and power. They do this through the deployment, use, and even
creation of identity property—wearing their colors, claiming territory, and
displaying gang symbols.
Gang injunctions follow, systematically dismantling gangs and
stripping gang members of the resilience fostered by the gang and to which
the state has failed to provide access. That gang injunctions decrease
resilience can be inferred from available empirical analyses of gang

163. Stu Marvel, Vulnerability Theory and Sexual Assault on Campus (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); see generally Stu Marvel, Response to Tuerkheimer –
Rape on and off Campus, The Vulnerable Subject of Rape Law: Rethinking Agency and
Consent, 65 EMORY L. J. 2035 (2016) (providing support for quoted material).
164. See supra notes 138 to 152 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 159 to 162 and accompanying text.
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injunctions.166 Qualitative research suggests that gang injunctions also
strip non-member inhabitants of gang territory of resilience.167
Using a vulnerability lens, through which the obligation of the state
is to support the development of resilience, rather than strip or impede it,
there is no defense of the gang injunction as it has been typically advanced.
As a social justice project that mandates the building of resilience,
vulnerability theory demands an alternative to gang injunctions. It requires
the state to destabilize (or destroy) one mechanism of resilience, while
replacing it with other mechanisms of resilience that provide a “better”
package of resources and relationships.
One such alternative is the compensated gang injunction.168 This
legal tool—by which the restrictions imposed by gang injunctions are
extracted only upon compensation—can diminish the collateral
criminality of gangs, while opening access to mainstream sources of
resilience. In such a model, local governments obtain injunctions against
a named street gang, specifying gang-related behavior that has created a
nuisance within the jurisdiction.169 In exchange for the injunction,
however, the local government is required to compensate the injunctees.
Simple monetary compensation would be largely consistent with the
claims developed above. Financial capital provides access to almost the
full range of resilience mechanisms contemplated within vulnerability and
property discourse, and from which the scholarly consensus suggests,
gang members are excluded. The one reported case that employed a
compensated injunction170 (and each of the three subsequent elaborations
thereof)171 contemplated monetary relief. Compensation in-kind, which is
the core of the paid gang injunction model advocated here, is more
consistent with those perspectives. It also more pragmatic.172 So, in
166. Maxson et al., Sake of the Neighborhood, supra note 139, at 254–57; Cheryl L.
Maxson, Civil Gang Injunctions: The Ambiguous Case of the National Migration of a Gang
Enforcement Strategy, in AMERICAN YOUTH GANGS AT THE MILLENNIUM 375, 378–79
(Finn-Aage Esbensen et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Maxson, The Ambiguous Case].
167. Lua K. Yuille, Dignity Takings in Gangland’s Suburban Frontier, 92 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 793, 803 (2018).
168. Lua K. Yuille, Blood In, Buyout: A Property & Economic Approach to Street
Gangs, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 1049, 1122–1125 (2015).
169. Consistent with the arguments offered here, the behavior would be limited to
otherwise lawful conduct. Already criminalized conduct would continue to be enforced
through existing criminal laws.
170. See Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705 (1972) (en banc).
171. Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71
IOWA L. REV. 775, 831 (1986); Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental
Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1343–47 (1977); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
681, 779–81 (1973).
172. The suggestions here are pragmatic because they recognize that sometimes
unwanted behavior can become so entrenched that manipulated social norms can be as
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exchange for refraining from gang activity pursuant to the injunction,
enjoined gang members would be offered pathways into the mainstream
capital and property system from which they are marginalized and to
which they have built an alternative. The idea of compensating individuals
to engage in desirable behaviors is wholly consistent with the economic
structures and foundations of many societies, and it has proven successful
in many areas where such commodification is originally interpreted
unfavorably.
For example, gaining increasing attention within the fields of
development and poverty economics are “conditional cash transfer”
programs in which government largesse is earned through attending
school, receiving vaccinations, or partaking in job training programs.173
Empirical and qualitative studies of these programs implemented in many
countries have concluded they are largely successful.174
The key features of a “service” model of compensation for reducing
gangs have also already been implemented in the work of various
institutions and organizations. In exchange for a commitment to remain
uninvolved in gang activity, these organizations’ constituents gain access
to a menu of capital producing services, including job training, education,
employment or employment counseling, mental health services, life
counseling, tattoo removal, and legal services.175
For example, the city of Richmond, California, has experimented
with the key conceptual features of a paid gang injunction. Through its the
Operation Peacemaker Fellowship,176 the city’s Office of Neighborhood
Services began a street outreach program to identify youth, aged 16-25,
responsible for violent crime in the city.177 Those youth were then offered
a fellowship in which they received counseling, social services, a job,
opportunities to travel, and up to a $1,000 a month for nine months in
exchange for developing a “life map,” staying in contact with the program
every day, and refraining from criminal activity.178 The program has
powerful as changing the law. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Symposium on Law, Psychology, and
the Emotions: The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1537–38 (2000)
(“[G]aining control over dysfunctional societies might depend more upon using or
manipulating social norms than upon enforcing the law”). The model of the compensated
gang injunction aims to create avenues for changing capital availability, which destabilizes
the structure of the unwanted social norms.
173. See, e.g., Evaluations, J-PAL, https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluations
?f[0]=field_policy_goal%3A6753 (cataloging 44 economic studies of such programs).
174. Id.
175. See infra notes 177 to 187 and accompanying text.
176. More about ONS Strategic Initiatives, CITY OF RICHMOND, CAL., http://carichmond.civicplus.com/2410/More-about-ONS-Strategic-Initiatives (last visited Feb. 17,
2019).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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received significant media attention because of its cash payments, but its
success remains untested.179 International implementation of a program,
with some of the conceptual features of the paid gang injunction, is also
untested. In 2014, the English coffee company, Kenco, launched “Coffee
vs. Gangs.”180 The very well publicized program181 offers Hondurans, aged
16 to 28, a training course taught by agricultural and business experts
designed to help them become independent coffee farmers in Honduras’
burgeoning coffee industry.182
Presaging the Richmond and Kenco experiments, Los Angeles’
Homeboy Industries is the longest-running, most well-known, and
successful anti-gang compensation initiative.183 The organization, which
is also the nation’s largest gang intervention and reintegration program,
targets former gang members with the most barriers to mainstream
employment, including extensive and visible tattoos, mental health
impediments, and significant or recent felony records.184 Upon acceptance
to the program, the individual is assigned a case manager with whom he
develops a service plan that reflects the gang member’s objectives and the
services in which he will participate to accomplish them.185 Depending on
the incoming skill level of the individual, he may receive a remunerated
job-training position in one of Homeboy Industries economic enterprises
with employers willing to hire Homeboy Industries’ difficult-to-employ
population.186 During their participation in the program, which is targeted
to last approximately eighteen months, participants also receive free social
services, including tattoo removal, parenting classes, high school
equivalency preparation, substance abuse counseling, clinical and group
mental health programming, language and life coaching, and legal
assistance.187

179. Id.
180. Wendy Hackshaw, Coffee vs Gangs, LATINO REBELS (June 30, 2016),
http://www.latinorebels.com/2016/06/30/coffee-vs-gangs/.
181. The company hosts social media pages dedicated to Coffee vs. Gangs, maintains
sponsored portals in UK news media outlets, and runs enthralling television campaigns
describing its efforts. Id.
182. Will Green, Kenco’s Coffee vs Gangs project just part of company’s efforts to
protect global supply chain, SUPPLY MANAGEMENT (May 20, 2015),
https://tinyurl.com/y33lbr79.
183. See Why We Do It, HOMEBOY INDUSTRIES, https://www.homeboyindustries.org
/why-we-do-it/ (providing more information about the organization); see also LEAP, supra
note 2, at 206–07, 210–13. See generally Celeste Fremon, G-Dog and the Homeboys, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1991, reprinted in THE MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6, at 325
(discussing the earlier gang intervention work of Homeboy’s founder, Gregory Boyle).
184. HOMEBOY INDUSTRIES, supra note 183.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Homeboy Industries reports that two-thirds of its “clients/trainees”
transition into full-time, mainstream employment,188 and disassociate with
at least the criminogenic element of gangs. Existing research indicates that
full-time, legitimate employment at any income level is associated with
decreases in and cessation of active gang involvement.189 Individuals may
continue to identify with a gang, but they reduce or stop their engagement
in criminal, tortfeasing, and otherwise objectionable gang conduct that is
the overarching concern of host communities. That evidence is supported
by anecdotal reports that gang members profess a desire and willingness
to refrain from entrepreneurial gang activity when comparable legitimate
economic activities are available. Since economic analyses of gang
finances indicate that the average gang member can earn no more than
$20,000 annually from gang-associated economic activities,190 licit
employment at this approximate income level is expected to result in the
termination of the types of gang conduct with which gang injunctions are
concerned, as well as the associated criminal conduct.
The operation of Homeboy Industries also appears responsive to the
enriched understanding of gangs advanced here and to the demands of
vulnerability theory. Rather than further marginalizing gang members
from mainstream markets, Homeboy Industries attempts to fill the same
economic, social, and cultural capital gaps that generate gangs and create
a bridge to mainstream networks and identity property access for its
service population. By engaging gang members with respect to the value
of their property, the process becomes community-affirming. Instead of
delegitimizing everything about the gang member, the community can
acknowledge the settlements gangs have made with respect to their
interests, and then give them a fundamental role in determining how to
accommodate or dispose of those interest in light of countervailing
community interests.
This article claims that the acquisition of resilience fostering identity
property through the means available to an individual, even if unlawful, is
not necessarily a moral failing of that individual.191 Instead, it is part of the
natural propensity or necessity to pursue identity property as a means to
confront one’s vulnerability. This claim is buttressed by the fact that
successful participants use their access to mainstream capital to pursue
traditional avenues of identity property.

188. Id.
189. Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note 77, at 759–60. But see Decker & Lauritsen, supra
note 95, at 69 (identifying violence as a significant factor motivating gang exit).
190. Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note 77, at 756.
191. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1095, 1132–33 (2007).
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Both theoretical and practical evaluations indicate that a
compensated gang injunction is a feasible and desirable alternative to the
gang injunction model of gang intervention and re-integration. That is, the
proposal remedies an observed exclusion from sanctioned social
institutions that promote the accumulation of capital that foster resilience.
However, they do nothing to prevent the capital deficits that result in gang
formation. Vulnerability theory and its demand for a responsive state that
affirmatively works to build and support social institutions that act as
resilience mechanisms requires such a comprehensive anti-gang strategy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

On its surface, this article is about street gangs, which occupy a
uniquely vilified position in American popular consciousness.
Notwithstanding the availability of a rich body of sociological,
criminological, and legal literature concerned with issues at the center and
in the penumbra of the phenomena, often ostensibly aimed at harnessing
intellectual and emotional sympathy, the members of gangs remain an
almost universally disdained population. Such aversion has impelled a
criminological approach to gangs that ignores their fundamental role.
In contrast, this article recognized that gangs are, essentially,
networked institutions of resilience that arise within alternative markets,
where mainstream institutions and systems have failed to provide
opportunities to create enough identity property to adequately inure gang
members and their communities to their vulnerability. Then, it suggested
that the paid injunction constitutes an appropriate satisfaction of the
responsive state’s duty to provide gang members with the assets or tools
to be resilient when their vulnerability is made manifest.
In telling its street gang story, the article illustrates the central role of
property in the concept of resilience. Resilience is the accumulation of
resources that permit individuals to cope with their vulnerability. This
idea—that the accumulation of resources (i.e. capital or property) allows
people to cope with their vulnerability—is central to a broad range of
property justifications.
In its interstices, this article develops some more broadly applicable
lessons. The vulnerability lens permits a deeper and more authentic
understanding of how people engage with each other and their
communities. While vulnerability is inextricable from the human
condition, so too is the universality and constancy of the human endeavor
to mitigate vulnerability. Gangs may be engaged in transgressive behavior,
but they are not pathological. They are responsive to need to build
mechanisms of resilience where few or none exist. This idea also flows
directly from numerous property perspectives. For example, property as
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freedom, property as personhood, property as entrance, property as
relative status—from any of these perspectives, what gangs do is create
sophisticated networks to respond to vulnerability faced by gang members.
What vulnerability theory adds to these varied contributions is its
demand for a responsive state. Even communitarian property perspectives
recognize property’s commitment to stability, immobility, and stasis192—
”reflexively resistant to change, preserving as it does the realm of settled
expectation.”193 The responsive state’s affirmative obligations open new
appropriate avenues for state intervention.

192. At the helm of the contemporary discussion of this ideal are Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1852–55 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 14–16 (2000). For an overview of this perspective’s critics,
see, for example, Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 444
(2011).
193. Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1607, 1659 (2010).

